



# Security Assessments

The Baylor University Experience



# Baylor in Overview

- 13,800 students, 2000 employees
- 85 buildings networked
- Server farm in DMZ

# Why an Assessment?

- ❑ Helps you stay out of the news!
- ❑ Legal and PR issues
- ❑ Defines a baseline for Risk Level



# Choosing a Vendor

- ❑ unbiased look at your system
- ❑ Expertise, experience
- ❑ Documentation -- Formal report
  - ❑ Good -- documents your vulnerabilities, engages your people.
  - ❑ Bad -- documents your vulnerabilities, now you're on the hook!

# Three types of vendors

## ☐ Tier Three

- ☐ Relatively inexpensive

- ☐ Relatively limited in scope, results.

## ☐ Tier Two

- ☐ External and internal scans

- ☐ medium to high cost.



# The High Priced Spread

- Scope, scans are customizable
- Verification of vulnerabilities
- Detailed (380pp!) report with recommendations

# Take-Away Lessons

- ❑ It's about trust and confidence
- ❑ Remember non-disclosure agreements
- ❑ Redefine scope after first meeting
- ❑ Watch those sensitive times -- things may break!
- ❑ Name a point person to handle ALL issues



# Take-away Lessons

- ❑ Social engineering will go on. Put 'em in a hidden location, don't warn rest of CIT.
- ❑ Social engineering is scary stuff!
- ❑ It takes a while, 2 weeks off-campus, 2 weeks on.
- ❑ Prioritize vulnerabilities and remediation



# Was it worth it?

- ☐ Got the attention of the right people
- ☐ Be inclusive of findings
  - ☐ IT personnel
  - ☐ Departmental IT personnel
  - ☐ General Counsel
  - ☐ Executive staff
- ☐ Multi-year agreement can reduce cost





# The BotHerd is Coming

University of Albany

Martin Manjak, ISO,  
Justin Azoff, Network Analyst



# About UAlbany

- 17,400 students, 700 faculty, 8000 residents
- September 2004
  - over 800 systems booted from network
  - 1000+ open tickets first week of class
  - 3 week wait for remediation appointment

# Never Again!

- ❑ Technical Track (later)
- ❑ Social Engineering Track
  - ❑ More about people than technology
  - ❑ Never stop working on awareness



# Need a Narrative

- ❑ "Didn't you read the letter we sent?"
- ❑ Technology is a turn-off to many.
- ❑ Craft a narrative where students can self-identify, "Did you hear the story about..."
- ❑ Focus on behaviour and change

# Design is Key

- ❑ Attractive format, good graphics
- ❑ People, not screen shots.
- ❑ Series of brochures were created
  - ❑ Trade 'em, collect the whole set!
- ❑ Advertised the Network Survival Kit



# The Security Quiz

- ☐ Online Quiz in Ethics and Security
- ☐ Required to gain Network access
- ☐ Must get 10 out of 10 right to pass
- ☐ Using the network means you passed, therefore you know the requirements, so
- ☐ No excuses when you're kicked off.

# 2004 vs. 2005 Results

- Cut September's trouble tickets in half
- While network registrations increased 23%



# Technology lags education

- ❑ XP SP2 Firewall, patches responsible for some reduction in vulnerabilities, but
- ❑ New threat vectors (AIM, web links) are emerging.
- ❑ Patches won't stop students (and staff!) from clicking
- ❑ Firewall on -- unable to scan it.

# Technical Measures

- ❑ 80k HTTP flows and 1 IRC? (not 6667)
- ❑ Never-admit IRC on Packetshaper, with a whitelist of servers
- ❑ Scan IPs using blocked IRC, collecting banners, if open.
- ❑ Interesting things can be observed...







# IRC Bots come in $2^{32}$ types

- ☐ Bots have one or more C&C IP addresses embedded in them
- ☐ IP based
  - ☐ Whack-a-mole, easy to detect
- ☐ DNS based
  - ☐ HA, load-balanced, redundant botnet!



# You.GotPwndBy.us

- ❑ When DNS bots wake up, they must resolve that C&C address.
- ❑ Log your DNS queries
  - ❑ Frequent flyers, bad hostname list
  - ❑ hosts in .info, .us, .cx, not .com, .edu
- ❑ IDS, IPS also a help (they didn't have)

# Resources

- ❑ Conference site: <http://www.educause.edu/Program/8355>
- ❑ Botnet slides: <http://www.albany.edu/~ja6447/educause/>
- ❑ UNiversity Security Operations Group, [unisog@lists.sans.org](mailto:unisog@lists.sans.org) (<http://www.dshield.org/mailman/listinfo/unisog>)
- ❑ [SECURITY@listserv.educause.edu](mailto:SECURITY@listserv.educause.edu)
- ❑ REN-ISAC, <http://ren-isac.net/>





# Shameless Plug

Suggestions? Comments?

Smaller Colleges -- Interested?

Presentation Topics, Tracks, Training?